A warrior on the battlefield without a battle is like a lawyer without a case. It is honest to say that there were some servicemen in Vietnam that preferred to STAY this way, while others were in for the FIGHT. This goes with the saying " Different FOLKS have different STROKES." However, in the type of warfare that I was in, I had no choice.
In my daily exposure in the river, I was sure that word had already spread, and had reached the Vietcongs' ears. And the word was that "there was a new PBR Boat Captain in the river". I was also sure that there were eyes watching every move that I made while making my traffic inspections, as well as how I was handling my boat. Those eyes could have been on the RIVER BOATS that I was inspecting, or at the RIVER BANKS where ambushes often take place. With these intuitions or "gut feelings", I became more vigilant which in turn transformed my way of thinking. It became SIMILAR to that of the ENEMY.
However, in war, sometimes being careful is NEVER ENOUGH. The enemy studies your moves day in and day out. Sooner or later the enemy will see your slightest flaw and when he DOES, pray to God that he MISSES his first shot (usually a B-40 ROCKET), and that you have sufficient firepower to suppress the enemy's fire. Get your boat OUT of the KILL ZONE by any means as FAST as you can. I've accepted this fact of war, however the "sooner or later" part happened quicker than I expected.
It was almost a MONTH since I took command of PBR 142 and I was starting to feel COMFORTABLE with my new position. Inspecting and controlling the river traffics of "sampans", cargo and passenger boats takes a lot of your patrol time. I knew that was one of the Vietcongs' tactic: To DIVERT the PBR's from their mission, as well as to pinpoint your exact location at any time in the river.
I'm DAMN sure that at least one (1) of the passengers on these passenger boats was a VC "sympathizer", and that they relayed messages to the Vietcongs. These were the number of PBR's on patrol, and which of the PBR's were patrolling a certain area.
And MOST IMPORTANT of all - "WHO is the Boat Captain?"
With this information, the VC got all the vital details they needed to set up for an ambush. I found this out 11 OCTOBER 1967.
PBR 142 and PBR 139 were out on patrol on the CU TIEU (the narrow side of the mouth of the MEKONG DELTA), almost 10 miles southeast of the Mytho. The river traffics were busy and the weather was humid with occasional rain. My FLAK JACKET and JOCK STRAP were getting to be irritable. It got wet and dry, causing an ITCHING sensation. However, having the possibility of "SNIPERS" at the river banks, I was reluctant to take them off in order to scratch.
To take my mind off thIS DAMN itching enigma, I started the engine, made a swing to PORT and made a run along the northern banks of CU TIEU. Watching the banks, all our eyes focused towards the GUIAO HOA canal. Through the binoculars, we spotted several unusual persons running on the river bank. "Sampans" (river boats) were going in all directions, with a lot of COMMONTION on the banks. I swung to port towards the middle of the river and put the engine on IDLE, radioed the Patrol Officer onboard PBR 139. Within minutes, PBR 139 was alongside.
LTJG. CRAGG, the Patrol Officer, made the assession and decided to check on the situation. PBR 139 led the way, with PBR 142 at her stern for cover. I sensed TROUBLE as we approached the canal. Something unusual was happening, we could NO LONGER SEE a single soul on the banks, but sampans were STILL frantically scurrying out of the canal. This was DEFINITELY trouble and I radioed PBR 139. LTJG CRAGG acknowledged my call, HOWEVER, CONTINUED to enter the GUIAO Canal.
Seeing this, I ordered my crew to get ready for a FIGHT. My Front Gunner to port, and my After Gunner and Engineman with the .60 Cal to starboard. Both PBR's were within more or less 50 yards inside the canal, when a HOOTCH on my starboard side EXPLODED, followed by gunfire on BOTH sides of the canal. Both PBR's opened fire and gunned the throttle FULL SPEED AHEAD, but going in the WRONG direction. We were going DEEPER inside the canal!
My radio was in full blast and I heard "DON'T LEAVE ME!" I didn't know who this was, nontheless I answered "Keep FIRING! I'm at your back!" This was followed by "TURN AROUND! TURN AROUND! WE'LL FIGHT OUR WAY OUT!!!"
This was a NARROW canal, and to make a 180 degree turn would be DISASTROUS. My months of training TOOK OVER my mind. I put the THROTTLE on IDLE, then FULL ASTERN, turned my wheel to PORT and "goosed" that starboard engine to FULL SPEED AHEAD. Within seconds PBR 142 was facing the way we came in. I'm DEAD SURE that this was the same manuever that EN2 Donald Davis, the Boat Commander of PBR 139, did. NOW were READY to FIGHT our way out of the GUIAO HOA canal. And FIGHT we did!
The VC elements were atill waiting, however in a SURPRISING way: Their shots were AIMLESS. Our's were for the KILL. Our EXIT was a lot easier than our ENTRY. As I cleared the entrance, I looked back and saw PBR 139 riding my wake and doing some HEAVY FIRING. As I reached the middle of the CUA TIEU, and all guns still HOT and READY, I put the engine on idle and waited for PBR 139 to come alongside. This gave us time to make a quick personnel and damge check.
I was almost in TEARS knowing neither boat had any damage. After radioing headquarters for further advice, LTJG Cragg calmly said "Let's head home." That was the BEST sound I'd heard on that day of 11 October 1967.
Back at My Tho, we assessed the situation and this is what we came up with: the commotions at the entrance of the Guiao Hoa canal was done ON PURPOSE to lure PBR's that were on patrol close to the river bank, thereby making them EASY TARGETS for a B-40 rocket shot. However, our actions somewhat puzzled the Vietcong. The PBR's entry to the canal was unusual, and with the sampans scurrying away in different directions contributed to that missed B-40 rocket.
I was sure that that missed shot was meant for PBR-142. Being the "cover boat" , my boat was at the REAR, and taking out my boat first would BLOCK the ENTRANCE to the canal. If that happened, both PBR's would be a "TURKEY SHOOT" for the Vietcongs positioned on both banks of kthe canal. WORST of all, had both PBR's continued to go DEEPER into the canal, ANOTHER ambush squad would MOST DEFINITELY be waiting to deliver the COUP DE GRACE.
We finished our assessment with a few bottles of "Ba Muy Ba", and with our hearts full of joy to see each other unscathed. We were now MORE DETERMINED to inflict heavy damage and unleash HELL towards the enemy. On my way back to "Hotel My Tho" (hotel converted into barracks), I stopped and paused for a while. I looked up at the sky. I didn't say much, but simply uttered "Thanks".
In retrospect, had I decided to STAY idle by the entrance of the GUIAO HOA canal, I wouldn't even be here to tell this story.
Days later, our assessments turned out to be TRUE...it was confirmed by the JACKSTAFF (a military newspaper) with the headline reading: "The Vietcongs SPOILED their OWN ambush!"
NEXT: The Bond with PBR-139
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